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CONVERSION OF JUDGMENTS MEASURED
IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Courts in the United States express money judgments for damages
in dollars.1 Generally, courts ignore fluctuations in the value of the dollar
between the time of injury or breach and the time of judgment.2 When a
plaintiff alleges damages that are measured in a particular foreign cur-
rency,3 however, the courts must translate those damages into United
States dollars.4 The question thus arises of which exchange rate the
court should use to convert damages into the equivalent value in dollars.
' Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1951).
United States courts express damages for torts as well as breach of contract in dollars. Id.;
see Bronson v. Rodes, 74 TU.S. (7 Wall.) 229, 251 (1868); Frontera Transp. Co. v. Abaunza, 271
F. 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1921); accord, Coinage Act of April 2, 1792, 31 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The
rule in England was similar to the United States requirement of judgment only in the forum
currency until the recent decision of Miliangos v. George Frank Textiles, Ltd. [1976] A.C.
443, 461. Prior to the Miliangos case, all English court judgments were in pounds. See Com-
ment, The Currency of Suit in Actions For Foreign Debts, 24 McGILL L. J. 422, 422 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Actions For Foreign Debts]; Knott, Foreign Currency Judgments in
Tort. An Illustration of the Wealth-Time Continuum, 43 MOD. L. REV. 18, 26-27 (1980). In
Miliangos, however, the House of Lords held that an English court can grant a judgment in
foreign currency under a contract governed by the law of a foreign country. [1976] A.C. at
443. The House of Lords has not decided whether courts will grant foreign currency
judgments in tort cases. Actions For Foreign Debts, supra at 436. Australia, Brazil, Den-
mark, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland and Switzerland now allow judgments in cur-
rencies foreign to the forum in both tort and contract cases. F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF
MONEY 351 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MANN]. Austria, Italy and Germany even go so
far as to dismiss a suit for damages valued in the currency of the forum if the contractual
money of account was a foreign currency. Id. at 351; see Fraenkel, Foreign Moneys in
Domestic Courts, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 360, 386 n.95 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Fraenkel].
2 Tillman v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1931), cert denied, 285
U.S. 539 (1932); Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N.Y. 163, 168,149 N.E. 338, 339 (1925);
Note, Dollar Damage Awards to Foreign Plaintiffs, 61 YALE L. J. 758, 758 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Dollar Damage Awards]; Fraenkel, supra note 1, at 360. English courts
also do not recognize fluctuations in the value of the national currency in determining
damages. See Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 2 A.C. 544, 560 (fluctuations in value of pound too
remote for consideration as element of damages and of no relevancy to tortious act).
' See Note, Fluctuating Rates of Exchange and the Conflict of Laws, 40 HARv. L.
REV. 619, 620 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Fluctuating Rates]. Damages measured in terms of
a foreign currency may result from contracts to deliver commodities, money of the forum, or
money of a third country to a foreign country. Id. at 620.
' Evan, Rationale of Valuation of Foreign Money Obligations, 54 MICH. L. REV. 307,
309 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Evan]; see McCrindle & Son Ltd. v. Durant, 611 F.2d 89, 91
(5th Cir. 1980). In Durant, the Fifth Circuit hold that no conversion into dollars is necessary
in cases when the contract expresses the obligation in both dollars and a foreign currency.
Id. at 91. Americans using international contractual arrangements may avoid the valuation
problem by drafting contractual obligations in terms of dollars and at least one other cur-
rency. Id.
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Courts generally use either the conversion rate available as of the date
of injury or the date of judgment.
5
Most federal and state courts faced with the foreign currency con-
version issue' have adopted the two rule doctrine established by the
Supreme Court in Hicks v. Guinness7 and Die Deutsche Bank Filiale
Nurnberg v. Humphrey! The two rule doctrine dictates the proper use
' See Fraenkel, supra note 1, at 362. United States courts have considered a number
of valuation dates, including the date of contracting, the date plaintiff instituted the suit,
the date of the trial, and the date of payment of the judgment. Id. In most cases the date of
judgment is the day the district court hands down a decision, even if another court subse-
quently modifies, affirms, or reverses the earlier judgment. See Reissner v. Rogers, 276
F.2d 506, 511 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960).
' Gutor Int'l AG. v. Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938, 943 (1st Cir. 1974). In the
Gutor case, Gutor International filed suit to recover the purchase price of 500 dictaphones
delivered to and accepted by Raymond Packer. Id. at 941-42. Gutor requested recovery in
Swiss francs or the equivalent dollar amount as of the judgment date. Id. at 943. The First
Circuit held that the proper conversion date was the judgment date because the debt was
payable in a foreign currency in a foreign country. See id. See also Conte v. Flota Mercante
Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1960); Wichita Mill & Elevator Co. v. Naamlooze
etc. Industrie, 3 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1925); Yeramex Int'l v. S. S. Tendo, 1977 A.M.C. 1807,
1838 (E.D. Va. 1977), modified 595 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1979). In Conte, an Argentine seaman
sued his employer, an Argentine shipowner, for injuries sustained on a vessel in interna-
tional waters. 277 F.2d at 670-71. The Second Circuit found that Argentine law applied and
the proper conversion date was the date of final judgment. Id. The Naamlooze case involved
a claim against a shipper of flour for losses resulting from the untimely transportation of
the goods. 3 F.2d at 933. The Fifth Circuit used the conversion rate available on the date of
the breach because the cause of action arose in a foreign country. Id. Yeramex concerned a
carrier's liability for damages incurred during shipment of goods to an overseas purchaser.
1977 A.M.C. at 1811. The district court held that when United States law governs a case in-
volving foreign currency the proper conversion rate is that rate prevailing on the date of
the breach. Id. at 1838.
7 269 U.S. 71 (1925). In Hicks, the United States government, at the outbreak of World
War I, seized property owned by hostile resident aliens. Id. at 79. Hicks, the Alien Property
Custodian, administered the property and discharged outstanding debts with seized funds.Id.
Certain American businessmen had a pre-war claim, valued in German marks, against a
German company. Id. These Americans sought to satisfy the mark debt through an action
against the German company's assets held by the Alien Property Custodian. Id. The
Supreme Court converted the claim from marks to dollars by setting the exchange rate as
of the date the mark debt was due to the American creditors. Id. at 80. Thus, the Court used
the breach date rule instead of basing its decision solely on a mechanical commodity concept
of currency. See text accompanying notes 31-38 infra. The Court indicated that choice of law
considerations dictated the outcome. 269 U.S. at 80. The debt was due and payable in the
United States. Id. Failure to pay created a dollar claim for damages under United States
law. Id. Although payment of the dollar value of the mark debt as of the judgment date
would have satisfied the claim had the laws of Germany governed, conversion at the breach
date exchange rate was proper because the claim arose under United States law. Id.
1 272 U.S. 517 (1926). In Humphrey, the Supreme Court further developed the two
rule doctrine. The Court explicitly rejected an inflexible commodity approach in favor of a
choice of law theory of conversion. Id. at 519; see text accompanying notes 31-38 infra. In
Humphrey, a United States citizen held a demand deposit with a German bank. 272 U.S. at
518. The German bank refused payment upon demand and Humphrey went to the Alien
Property Custodian for satisfaction of the debt. Id. The value of the German mark fell
[Vol. XXXIX
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of either the breach date or the judgment date for conversion of
damages into United States dollars.' The breach date rule requires con-
version of a foreign currency judgment at the exchange rate available on
the date of the injury."0 The judgment date rule sets the conversion rate
as of the date of final judgment.1 Use of either the judgment date rule or
the breach date rule depends upon the function of money in the breached
contract.12
The basis of the two rule doctrine is a dual function concept of
money." For purposes of the doctrine, currency can operate in two dif-
ferent ways." Currency can function as a commodity or as a measure of
sharply after the initial demand. Id. Humphrey sought application of the breach date rule to
determine the amount of his recovery. Id. The Supreme Court held that Humphrey had no
claim under United States law, that German law determined the bank's liability, and that
United States courts could grant a judgment only for that number of dollars equal to the
value of the mark recovery awarded by a German court. Id. at 519. Thus, the Court ordered
conversion at the judgment date exchange rate. Id.
' Fluctuating Rates, supra note 3, at 620. Two notable exceptions to the adoption of
the two rule doctrine are California and New York. See Compania Engraw Commercial E.
Indus. S.A. v. Schenley Dist. Corp., 181 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1950); De Sayve v. De La
Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 143, 154-55 (1953) (holding that even though French law governed
case, New York law dictated use of breach date rather than judgment date rule), affd 130
N.Y.S. 2d 865 (1954). Both New York and California employ the breach date rule regardless
of choice of law considerations. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1005 at 55 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as CORBIN]. Thus, in California and New York, breach of contract in either a foreign
country or in the United States will result in application of the breach date rule. Id. at 55.
But see Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 424-25, 110 N.Y.S. 2d
383, 389 (1952) (breach date conversion proper where plaintiffs principal place of business
was in United States and plaintiff would have immediately converted funds into United
States currency). At least one New York decision has stated explicitly, however, that the
correct New York rule is the two rule doctrine. United Shellac Corp. v. A.M. Jordan, Ltd.,
277 App. Div. 147, 153, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 817, 822 (1950).
The Ninth Circuit and the New York courts have held ,that the conversion rules
established by Hicks and Humphrey do not bind the states. Compania Engraw Commercial
E. Indus. S.A. v. Schenley Dist. Corp., 181 F.2d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 1950); De Sayve v. De La
Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 143, 154-55 (1953), affd 130 N.Y.S. 2d 865 (1954). The Ninth Circuit
held in Schenley that the California courts could follow the so-called "New York" rule
rather than the two rule doctrine. 181 F.2d at 876. The Ninth Circuit also found that the
judgment date rule applied only to fields of purely federal concern, such as admiralty, Id at
876.
10 See Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 80 (1925); Bamberger v. Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 488
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam); The Gylfe v. The Trujillo, 209 F.2d 386, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1954);
De Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409, 412.
", See Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926);
Wyse v. Pioneer-Cafeteria Feeds, Ltd., 340 F.2d 719, 725 (6th Cir. 1965); Paris v. Central
Chiclera, 193 F.2d 960, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1952); Laminoirs, etc. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp.
1063, 1070-71 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (Supplemental opinion); Dollar Damage Awards, supra note 2,
at 760.
12 Evan, supra note 4, at 319-23; see text accompanying notes 13-20 infra.
" See Note, The Measurement of Foreign Money Obligations, 36 VA. L. REv. 215,
219-23 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Measurement of Foreign Money].
", See Evan, supra note 4, at 319-23; note 27 infra.
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value. 15 When a currency functions as a commodity its value fluctuates
with the market. 6 When a currency operates as a measure of value or
money it has a constant fixed value. 7 The currency is the standard
against which purchasers measure the value of a given commodity. 8
When foreign currency functions as a commodity, the two rule doctrine
dictates that the breach date determines the conversion rate. 9 When the
foreign currency functions as money, however, the judgment date rule
applies.
Courts use choice of law theories to determine the function of cur-
rency in a given transaction." The Supreme Court followed a nineteenth
century "vested rights" choice of law theory in Hicks and Humphrey.'
Under the vested rights theory, the function of money in the country
where the breach occurred is determinative.' For example, the breach
of a foreign money contract in the United States creates a claim for
dollars as of the date of the breach. 4 Courts would treat the foreign
money as a commodity and apply the breach date rule." The breach of a
contract in a foreign country, however, creates a claim for a fixed
15 Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 220.
" Id. at 220.
17 Id.
18 Id.
" The Verdi, 268 F. 908, 909-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). In The Verdi, the court used the
breach date rule to convert damages valued in pounds sterling into United States dollars.
Id. at 909. The court determined that dollars functioned as money in the circumstances of
the case. Id. at 909. Pounds operated as a commodity. Id. The court settled on breach date
conversion to value the commodity in terms of the unit of measure, the dollar. Id.
" Paris v. Central Chiclera, 193 F.2d 960, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1952). The Paris court deter-
mined that the parties entered into the contract in Mexico, intended to perform the contract
in Mexico, and agreed to make payment in Mexican pesos. Id. at 962. The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the pesos operated as money and the judgment date was the proper conversion
date. Id. at 962-63. Bubble gum was the commodity sold under the contract. Id. at 961. The
parties used pesos as a measure of value of the contracted commodity. Id. at 962.
" Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 222-23.
See Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 80 (1925); Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v.
Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926); Reiblich, The Conflict of Laws Philosophy of Mr.
Justice Holmes, 28 GEO. L. J. 1, 8 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Reiblich]; text accompanying
notes 38-58 infra.
Fluctuating Rates, supra note 3, at 625; see text accompanying notes 38-58 infra.
Courts have considered a variety of supplemental factors in determining the function of
money. Fluctuating Rates, supra note 3, at 625. The place of contract, the money of con-
tract, and the place of performance, as well as the situs of the breach, help determine the
function of money. Paris v. Central Chiclera, 193 F.2d 960, 962 (5th Cir. 1952); Evan, supra
note 4, at 319, n.51.
' See Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 80 (1925); Evan, supra note 4, at 322. At least one
commentator's analysis of the proper valuation date depends on the place of performance
rather than the place of breach. Id. at 320. In many situations the distinction creates no dif-
ference in result because contract breaches often occur at the place of performance. Id. The
choice of law issue, however, still determines the function of currency. Measurement of
Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 222-23..
" Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 80 (1925).
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number of units of that country's currency.26 Since foreign currency, like
United States dollars, operates as money in the country of issuance,'
the claim for foreign money does not fluctuate with the exchange rate.28
The judgment date rule thus prevents recovery of losses or realization
of gains resulting from exchange rate fluctuations.29 United States
courts use the judgment date rule to limit the value of recovery to what
a foreign court would have awarded the plaintiff.2 "
Prior to Hicks and Humphrey, courts converted foreign money
judgments at the rate of exchange on the date of the breach." Courts ap-
plied the breach date rule mechanically without determining the govern-
ing law or the actual function of the foreign currency.2 The rationale for
a mechanical application of the breach date rule was a commodity con-
cept of money.' Courts viewed foreign currency as a commodity similar
" Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517,.519 (1926); Paris v.
Central Chiclera, 193 F.2d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1952); Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The
Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955-56 (2d Cir. 1952); CORBIN, supra note 9, at 52-3. The law of
the foreign country determines the extent of the breaching party's liability. 272 U.S. at 520.
See Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 219-23. The theory of
nominalism is the basis of the money concept of currency. Id. at 219. Under nominalism, cur-
rency acts as a measure of value. Id. Each unit of the currency has a fixed and unchanging
value. Id. A debtor satisfies a debt expressed in dollars by payment of that exact number of
dollars without reference to the exchange rate. Id. at 220. The value of the dollar as a unit of
measure never changes. Id. Two currencies cannot, however, both be units of measure in
terms of the other currency. Id. The role of each currency as money or commodity depends
upon the conflict of law theory followed by the court. Id. at 223. The law of the governing
state dictates the function of the currencies. Id. at 220. The currency of a country acts as a
measure of value in that country. See id.; see also Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 458 (1870).
1 See Evan, supra note 4, at 320-22. The nominalism theory requires a fixed unit of
measure. See note 27 supra. Consequently, courts recognizing nominalism do not adjust
judgments for changes in the value of the currency. Measurement of Foreign Money, supra
note 13, at 219-23. Similarly, a party cannot receive damages for losses resulting from fluc-
tuations in the value of a unit of measure. Id. The value of money does not change and no
damages are recoverable. Courts do recognize, however, a change in the value of a commo-
dity. The value of a commodity, such as steel, changes periodically and courts can grant
damages for breach of a contract to deliver a commodity. Evan, supra note 4, at 320-22. The
measure of damages is the difference between the contract value of the item and the market
value at the time of the breach. See U.C.C. § 2-713(1); U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1980 version).
Therefore, when currency acts as commodity, damages are recoverable. CORBIN, supra note
9, at 58; Evan, supra note 4, at 322. When currency acts as money there are no damages,
since there has been no change in the value of the money. Evan, supra note 4, at 322.
29 CORBIN, supra note 9, at 58.
Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926).
31 Wichita Mill & Elevator Co. v. Naamlooze etc. Industrie, 3 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir.
1925); Guiness v. Miller, 299 F. 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1924); Wormser Bros. v. F. Marroguin & Co.,
249 F. 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1918).
1 Wormser Bros. v. F. Marroguin & Co., 249 F. 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1918). The Fifth Cir-
cuit in Wormser Bros. automatically used the judgment date rate without reference to the
proper governing law. Id. The court noted nothing more than that the Mexican peso was the
currency of contract. Id. Even though the parties used the peso as a measure of value and
not as a commodity, the court applied the breach date rule. Id.
I See Evan, supra note 4, at 307-15.
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to a bushel of corn or a ton of steel.' Consequently, the rules for breach
of contract to deliver a commodity applied to contractual dealings in a
foreign currency. 5 Courts, therefore, would determine damages by find-
ing the difference between the contract price and the market price at
the time of the breach." The breach date exchange rate determined the
dollar value of the damages. 7 The Hicks and Humphrey decisions
destroyed this mechanical rule and established dual commodity and
money concepts of foreign currency.
38
Under the two rule doctrine, the judgment date rule applies only
when the foreign currency operates as money and the law of the foreign
country governs the cause of action. 9 The breach date rule applies when
the currency functions as a commodity and the law of the forum governs."0
The proper application of the two rule doctrine depends upon a correct
determination of the function of money in a particular transaction.4 '
Since Hicks and Humphrey established the vested rights theory of con-
flict of law as the guide for determination of the true function of the cur-
rencies involved,42 the continued appropriateness of the two rule doc-
trine depends in part upon the viability of the vested rights theory.
4 3
The cornerstone of the vested rights theory of conflict of law is a
strict interpretation of territorial sovereignty." The vested rights
See Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 521 (1926)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland's dissent in Humphrey reflects the state of
case law prior to the emergence of the two rule doctrine. See Fluctuating Rates, supra note
3, at 620-21.
1 See Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 614 (1891) (identical rules for breach for com-
modity contract and for tort and contract damages).
" See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1410A, at 610 (3d ed. 1968).
37 Id.
I Humphrey, 272 U.S. at 519-23; Hicks, 269 U.S. at 80; see Evan, supra note 4, at 319-23;
Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 220; see notes 7 & 8 supra.
, CORBIN, supra note 9, at 620.
40 Evan, supra note 4, at 322.
" Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 223.
42 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
'3 See text accompanying notes 59-76 infra.
11 See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 5. The territorial theory maintains that the law of a
state exists within its boundaries and nowhere else. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme
Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533,
535-36 (1926); Reiblich, supra note 22, at 5. Commentators have criticized the territorial
theory as being vague and subject to erroneous interpretation. See, e.g., Cook, The
Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 368, 369-70
(1931); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457, 459
(1924); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736,
743 (1924) [hereinafter cited as.Lorenzen]. Professor Corbin has stated that wide criticism of
the territorial theory prevents him from advocating continued application of the theory.
CORBIN, supra note 9, at 61. The vested rights theory adopts the principles of territoriality
through the assumption that only one country's law can govern a cause of action and all
countries' courts should recognize the right created by the foreign law. See Reiblich, supra
note 22, at 5.
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theory requires a court to enforce a right created by the law of a foreign
sovereign." Under the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, however, the
law' of a foreign nation does not operate directly outside of that
country."6 Nor can a court of the United States apply United States law
to a foreign right."7 Under the vested rights theory an act outside the
United States that gives rise to a cause of action under a foreign law
creates an obligation that United States courts should enforce." The
foreign law determines the existence and extent of the obligation.4 9
Thus, United States courts would enforce, but not alter, the right
created by the foreign law." Moreover, according to the theory, a United
States court can refuse to enforce a vested foreign right only if enforce-
ment is contrary to the public policy of the forum."
The vested rights theory requires a determination of which country's
law governs the cause of action.2 Criteria used to find the governing law
in contract cases include the place of breach, the place of performance,
the place of contracting, the currency of the contract, and the nationality
of the contracting parties.- The two rule doctrine incorporates the
vested rights theory to determine which law governs a cause of action
" See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909);
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). In Slater, United States citizens
brought a wrongful death action arising out of a railroad accident in Mexico against a
United States corporation. 194 U.S. at 124. The Supreme Court found that the law of the
situs determines the existence and the extent of the obligation. Id. at 126. However, the law
of the situs does not operate outside the sovereign territory that created the law. Id. Fur-
thermore, the wrongful act is not subject to the laws of the forum state. Id. The Supreme
Court held that, although the wrongful act was not subject to any law in force in the forum,
the act created an obligation that United States courts should enforce. Id.
In American Banana, the plaintiff urged the Supreme Court to use United States anti-
trust statutes as the basis for defendant's liability for activities occurring in Panama and
Costa Rica. 213 U.S. at 354. The Court held that a United States statute has no effect on ac-
tivities in another sovereign territory. Id. at 357. The Court stressed the conclusion that the
character of an act as unlawful can only be determined by the law of the situs. Id. at 356.
The operation of a statute is confined to the territorial limits over which the law maker has
power. Id. at 357.
"See note 44 supra.
" Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
"See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 5-6.
" Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 10.
51 Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912). See Reiblich, supra note 22, at
10-11.
I Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 222.
"See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 16-17. Courts consider very few factors in analyzing
choice of law questions. Fluctuating Rates, supra note 3, at 625, One or two facts, such as
the place of the breach and the nationality of the parties, often form the basis of the choice
of law decision. Evan, supra note 4, at 323. One commentator indicates that the factors used
by courts in analyzing choice of law questions are arbitrary and without social justification.
Reiblich, supra note 22, at 16-17.
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involving foreign currency resulting from a breach of contract or tort."
The governing law determines whether the foreign currency acts as a
commodity or as money.5 If United States law governs, the courts
assume that the foreign currency acts as a commodity. 6 If the foreign
law governs, United States courts assume that the currency functions
as money. 7 In both Hicks and Humphrey, the Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the breach date rule or judgment date rule depended upon the
choice of law determination, which in turn depended upon a vested
rights analysis. 8
Since the Hicks and Humphrey decisions, commentators have ques-
tioned the vested rights theory of choice of law.59 The vested rights
theory operates under a territorial concept of power." Territoriality
assumes that one law governs any transaction, that no other law can be
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]. The determination of governing law turns on choice of law considerations.
The theory currently used by United States courts bases the choice of law finding on the
country that has the most significant relationship or interest in the issue. Id. The state,
where the conduct or injury occurred is not necessarily the state most concerned with the
judgment for damages resulting from a tort. Id. Absent unusual circumstances, however, it
is likely that the local law will apply. Id. The factors considered in determining the relation-
ship of a state to the action are the needs of the interstate and international systems, the
policies of the forum, the policies of other interested states, a state's justifiable expecta-
tions, certainty, predictability, uniformity, and ease of application of the governing law. Id.
§ 6. The choice of law determination in contract disputes follows almost the same principles
employed in tort cases. Id § 188. Courts apply these principles in light of the contacts
that the contracting parties had with the countries in question. Id. The contacts include the
place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the location of the
subject matter and the nationality of the parties. Id. In contrast, the vested rights theory
examines only the contacts in order to determine the choice of law question. Note 53 supra;
see note 64 infra.
" See Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 222-23.
" Evan, supra note 4, at 320-21.
" CORBIN, supra note 9, at 54.
" See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 8-10; Jones, The Spurious Judgment Day Rule For
Converting Foreign Currency into Dollars When Suit is Brought Upon an Obligation
Governed By Foreign Law, 3 INT'L LAWYER 277, 287-90 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
See 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 886 (M. Howe, Ed., 1953); HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 190,
190-93 (1940). Justice Holmes' Hicks and Humphrey opinions reflect the notion that the law
is not a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 886 (M. Howe, Ed.
1953). A legal right must be created by the law of a particular country to be a concrete
entity. Id. A claimant cannot assert mere fundamental concepts of morality as the basis of a
claim. Id. A claimant must assert a concrete right created by the laws of a particular coun-
try, and once the governing law creates the right, the vested rights theory requires enforce-
ment of that right by the forum court. See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
" See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 16-17 (vested rights theory offers no social justifica-
tion for results it dictates); see Lorenzen, supra note 44, at 743. Several commentators have
indicated that the territorial theory is no longer a valid basis for any choice of law theory.
Id.; CORBIN, supra note 9, at 61.
" Reiblich, supra note 22, at 1-2; see text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
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controlling, and that all courts must recognize a right arising from the
one proper law. 1 The flaw in the territoriality assumption is its
postulate that a particular-state's law is the only appropriate governing
law for a given transaction.12 A contract involving parties from two coun-
tries, performance in a third country, contracting in a fourth, and suit
brought in a fifth would not be subject to the exclusive control of one
country's law. 3 Moreover, the vested rights theory compounds the
shortcomings of the territorial concept by using arbitrary criteria to
determine the controlling law. The criteria include the place of breach,
the place of performance, the place of contracting, the currency of con-
tract, and the nationality of the contracting parties. 4 Although these
criteria allow an easy determination of the governing law, there is little
other social justification for their use as the decisive factors in the choice
of law decision.65 Decisions subsequent to Hicks and Humphrey have
employed only one or two of the choice of law criteria along with a
limited analysis of the facts in deciding upon the governing law.6 Having
determined the governing law, United States courts proceeded to en-
force the right created by that law.67 The vested rights theory does not
adequately analyze and answer the difficult question of which country's
law is the most appropriate law to govern a particular transaction. The
focus of the theory is on the enforcement of rights created under the
foreign law rather than on a thoughtful analysis of the choice of law prob-
lem."
61 Reiblich, supra note 22, at 16.
62 Lorenzen, supra note 44, at 743.
" See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 16-17.
See Evan, supra note 4, at 319 n.51; note 54 supra. The issue of the relative impor-
tance that courts should give to criteria such as the nationality of the contracting parties,
the currency of the contract and the place of contracting in making the choice of law deci-
sion is uncertain. Reiblich, supra note 22, at 18. Courts frequently apply the criteria ar-
bitrarily. Id Current choice of law theories use similar choice of law criteria. Modern
theories, however, use conflict of law principles to determine the relative importance of a
specific factor. See note 54 supra. Use of the conflict of law principles yield a rational, soci-
ally justified choice of law conclusion. Id
Reiblich, supra note 22, at 17.
Evan, supra note 4, at 323. In Laminoirs, etc. v. Southwire Co. 484 F. Supp. 1063,
1070 (N.D. Ga. 1980), French law governed the cause of action because the defendant owed a
franc debt payable in France. 484 F. Supp. at 1070. Since French law governed, the court
concluded that the judgment date determined the conversion rate. Id. In Bamberger v.
Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), the court indicated that the critical fac-
tor in determining the conversion date is the contracted place of payment. 390 F.2d at 487.
The court found that since payment could occur in the United States, the breach date rule
applied. Id. at 489. In Paris v. Central Chiclera, 193 F.2d 960, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1952), the Fifth
Circuit found that Mexican law governed the cause of action because the place of perfor-
mance, currency of contract, and place of contracting were in Mexico. Id. at 962-63.
67 See Reiblich, supra note 22, at 14-15:
" Id.
1982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
Current choice of law theories ascertain the governing law by
evaluating the facts of a case to determine the jurisdiction of most
significant relationship. 9 Modern theories apply a set of equitable prin-
ciples that reflect the assumption that a number of states may have.an
interest in the issue before the court. 0 The choice of law factors relevant
to a determination of the governing law include the needs of an interna-
tional legal system, the relevant policies of the forum and other in-
terested states, the relative interests of other states in the particular
issue, the protection of expectations, uniformity of result, ease of ap-
plication of the governing law, and the basic policies underlying the par-
ticular field of law.
71
A basic policy of the law of damages is that any recovery should put
the plaintiff in as good a position as if no breach had occurred.72 The
vested rights theory ignores the principles of modern choice of law
theories, and consequently, the two rule doctrine can yield results that
over or under compensate the plaintiff. In Humphrey, for example, the
Supreme Court's judgment date holding reduced the applicable conver-
sion rate from 21 cents to 1.3 cents per mark.73 The vested rights theory
dictated use of the judgment date rule simply because the debt arose in
Germany. 4 Judgment date conversion in this case prevented the grant-
ing of a fully compensatory judgment. Thus, the correct determination of
the governing law is critical to the proper operation of the two rule doc-
trine. 5 Nevertheless, the limited analysis and arbitrary criteria" used
by the vested rights theory can yield an improper choice of law conclu-
sion. Continued use by United States courts of the vested rights theory
as the basis of the two rule doctrine may be improper in light of the
theoretical and equitable shortcomings of the theory.
The comity of nations and the local-law theories are alternatives to
the vested rights theory that could support continued application of the
current two rule doctrine.7 Under the comity of nations theory of choice
of law, the courts of the forum nation voluntarily apply foreign law
within the territory of the forum nation. 78 Application of the foreign law
0 RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 144.
70 Id. § 6.
71 Id. The current choice of law theories reflect the complexities involved with the
choice of law decisions. Id. at 13. The complex factual and policy considerations of the choice
of law decision prevent the formulation of specific rules for easy determination of the
governing law. Id. The complexity of the choice of law field allows only for use of general
principles of guidance. Id. The RESTATEMENT provides flexible guidelines under the general
theory of state of most significant relationship. Id.
"' CORBIN, supra note 9, at 63.
71 Jones, supra note 58, at 286; see 272 U.S. at 518.
11 272 U.S. at 519.
71 See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
76 See text accompanying notes 53 supra.
7 Reiblich, supra note 22, at 11-15.
" STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 38 [hereinafter cited as STORY].
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is inadmissible only when it is contrary to the policy of the forum state. 9
Nevertheless, although the comity theory is more flexible than the
vested rights theory, the comity theory has significant disadvantages as
a base for the two rule doctrine." The comity theory is inadequate as an
explanation of which law applies, when the forum court adopts the
foreign law, or why the forum court adopts a foreign law. 1 The comity
theory and the vested rights theory both use arbitrary criteria to deter-
mine which law creates and governs a particular cause of action. 2 These
criteria, which are based on the discredited territorial concept of law, do
not always yield a proper choice of law conclusion.' Furthermore, the
comity theory does not establish standards for determining whether a
foreign law conflicts with a policy of the forum." A forum court could
refuse to enforce a foreign claim if the forum court had a policy against
foreign laws that are different but do not conflict with the law of the
forum." Commentators have criticized the use of the comity theory
because of perceived judicial opposition to the enforcement of foreign
law."
The local-law theory is another alternative to the vested rights
theory.8 7 The local-law theory indicates that the law of the forum creates
I Id. Under the comity theory, the Humphrey judgment, See note 8 supra, would have
been the same as that originally granted by the Supreme Court. The rationale behind the
comity theory, however, differs from the vested rights reasoning. Reiblich, supra note 22, at
14-15. The vested rights analysis in Humphrey recognized a right created by a foreign law
that vested in the plaintiff in Germany. 272 U.S. at 591. The comity theory would enforce
German law because the governing law did not conflict with the public policy of the forum.
STORY, supra § 38.
Reiblich, supra note 22, at 14-15.
'1 Id.
Id. The comity theory employs the same arbitrary criteria used by the vested rights
theory to determine the governing law. See note 53 supra.
Lorenzen, supra note 44, at 742-43.
STORY, supra note 134, § 38. The comity of nations theory derives completely from the
voluntary application of foreign law by the forum. Id. Courts will not apply the foreign law
if there is a policy restricting the operation of foreign law, or if the foreign law is contrary
to public policy or prejudicial to the interests of the forum. Id. These guidelines are very
broad and often allow a court to avoid the application of foreign law. Reiblich, supra note 22,
at 14-15; see Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 20-22 (1917). The Supreme Court indicated in Bond
that an independent state will not enforce a contract under the comity theory where en-
forcement would offend good morals or lead to the disturbance of local law. Id. at 20. The
law-making power of a state defines public policy, and courts will not enforce a contract that
is a manifest violation of the legislatively determined public policy. Id. at 22.
" See Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 114, 183 A. 569, 570 (1936) (Maryland refused to
enforce, a claim arising in a state whose wrongful death statute differed from but did not
conflict with Maryland's).
', Reiblich, supra note 22, at 15-16 (arguing that judges have an understandable
tendency not to enforce foreign law as readily as they would enforce domestic law). See
Dodd, supra note 44, at 536 (indicating that comity means courtesy between sovereigns
rather than between courts and rarely involves enforcement of purely private rights).
Reiblich, supra note 22, at 14.
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the right and remedy in all cases.8 When an act occurs in another state
the forum court may create a right identical to the right created by the
foreign state's law. 9 Under the local-law theory, a United States court
would use the judgment date rule only when the court found it appropriate
to fashion a remedy similar to the remedy created by the foreign law.9 0 The
local-law theory has shortcomings similar to the vested rights and comity
of nations theories.91 There are no standards for determining which
state's law a court should use as a guide for fashioning relief. 2 Further-
more, there is no indication of when it is appropriate to use the foreign
law instead of the forum's law.9" Consequently, it appears doubtful that
the local-law theory can support application of the two rule doctrine in
its current form. 4
Although commentators have questioned the theoretical underpin-
nings of the two rule doctrine, several-practical considerations support
the doctrine. 5 The first advantage of the two rule doctrine is its ease of
application. The court does not have to determine the value of the
foreign currency relative to the dollar, and need not inquire into the
changes in relative purchasing power or the effect of inflation on the cur-
rencies. 97 The court need only determine the proper exchange rate on
88 Id.
11 Id.; see The James McGee, 300 F. 93, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). In McGee, the court held
that a court cannot enforce an obligation created by a foreign law. Id. A United States court
can merely recognize the original right and create a remedy that copies as closely as possi-
ble the remedy available in the foreign court. Id.
'o Reiblich, supra note 22, at 14.
" Id.; see text accompanying notes 59-68 and 81-86 supra.
92 Reiblich, supra note 22, at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id. One commentor interprets the local-law theory as a more accurate description of
the choice of law process than either the vested rights or comity theories. Id. The commen-
tator reaches his conclusion because the local-law theory rejects any attempt to dictate
when the forum must enforce a foreign law. Id. The local-law theory emphasizes that the
court determines the controlling principles of law. Furthermore, the local-law theory allows
a court to examine policy considerations behind the choice of law decision. Id. The vested
rights theory and the comity theory mechanically apply a foreign nation's law. Id. The
vested and comity approaches do not allow consideration of choice of law policy concerns.
See text accompanying notes 59-72 supra.
9 See note 44 supra.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 6, comment j (choice of law principles should be
simple and easy for courts to apply).
'" CORBIN, supra note 9, at 60; see Dollar Damage Awards, supra note 2, at 762-63.
Commentators have urged United States courts to adopt a procedural rule allowing adjust-
ment of damage judgments for the effects of inflation. Id. A procedure designed to account
for inflation would compensate the injured party for loss of purchasing power. Id. at 764. A
court would determine the change in the relative purchasing power of the currencies involv-
ed. Id. at 762-63. The consumer price index is an available indicator of a country's general
price level. Id. A court would increase or decrease a judgment depending upon the relative
changes in the value of both currencies. Id. The adjustment process would be difficult and
time consuming if a court considered economic factors other than purchasing power loss. Id.
Nevertheless, the ready availability of the consumer price indexes for most countries makes
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the valuation date.98 Conversely, a court need not undertake time con-
suming consideration of complex economic data concerning real value
and inflation.99 In short, the two rule doctrine promotes judicial economy.
The two rule doctrine also produces consistency, continuity, and
predictability. The established criteria that dictate determination of the
proper conversion date do not change with varying policies favoring the
plaintiff or the defendant."' The place of the breach usually determines
the exchange rate.' Reliance on these objective choice of law factors
permits the contracting parties to anticipate the consequences of a
damage suit for breach of contract.' Furthermore, the judgment date
rule enables the forum court to maintain consistency with the foreign
court whose law governs the case.0 3 Since the value of a judgment
granted by the forum would equal that granted by a foreign court, the
plaintiff has no monetary incentive to change jurisdictions.' This unifor-
mity prevents a plaintiff from forum shopping to find the most accom-
modating court.'
The comity of nations theory or the local-law theory and practical
considerations support continued use of the two rule doctrine. Never-
theless, the doctrine can yield disparate consequences and foster un-
sound policy. Inequities may result from the two rule doctrine's failure
to account for the effect of the breach date and judgment date rules, and
the procedure manageable. See, e.g., MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS (United Nations); IN-
TERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS (International Monetary Fund) (sources of consumer
price data).
" See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
Dollar Damage Awards, supra note 2, at 762-63. The economic data considered by a
court in an adjustment procedure can be simple or complex. Id. The most accessible and
usable data would be the consumer price indexes of the countries involved. Id.; see note 100
supra.
100 Fluctuating Rates, supra note 3, at 625.
101 See Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, Ltd. v. United Shipping, 643 F.2d 376, 380-81 (5th
Cir. 1981).
100 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 6, at 15-16, comment i (consistency, predictabil-
ity, and uniformity are important goals of choice of law analysis). See also McCrindle & Son,
Ltd. v. Durant, 611 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1980). The parties to a contract can make provisions
in the contract to avoid application of the two rule doctrine. Id. In Durant, the Fifth Circuit
held that a court does not have to set a conversion rate if the parties have contracted in
terms of more than one currency or have stipulated an exchange rate. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 54, § 188.
10I RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 144, at 405-407. Consistency with a foreign court dif-
fers from the comity of law theory advanced by Justice Story. The comity theory is a choice
of law theory that dictates the law governing the case. See text accompanying notes 77-86
supra. The conclusion on the proper law question in turn allows the court to apply either the
breach or judgment-day rules. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. The consistency
concept does not address the choice of law question. Consistency of result eliminates the
possibility of a plaintiff shopping for a forum that will grant him the largest judgment.
Reiblich, supra note 22, at 14-17.
104 CORBIN, supra note 9, at 59.
I RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 6, at 15, comment j.
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the doctrine can produce judgments that do not fully compensate the in-
jured party."' The doctrine ignores the effects of inflation on the value
of the currency of recovery. The breach date rule assumes that the real
value of the dollar is constant. The judgment date rule enforces the fic-
tion that the real value of foreign currency remains stable.1" For exam-
ple, suppose two parties contracted in New York for the delivery on
January 1, 1982 of 1,000 English pounds for trade in the United States
market. On January 1 the English party breaches the contract and the
Americans file suit shortly thereafter. According to the vested rights
theory, United States law governs the action because the contract was
entered into and performance was due in the United States. A United
States court, therefore, would hold that'the breach date rule applies.
Assuming an exchange rate of two dollars per pound on January 1, the
court would grant a judgment of $2,000. If, however, the United States
experienced an inflation rate of 10% in the period between the breach
and the payment of the judgment, the real value of the judgment
granted would be only $1,800. The $1,800 in real value would not com-
pensate the injured party for his loss. The English party would benefit
from the court's failure to account for inflation. In contrast, if deflation
of like magnitude had occurred, the plaintiff would receive a judgment of
$2,200 in real value. Similarly, the devaluation of the currency of con-
tract in terms of the forum currency has deleterious effects on one of the
parties when a court strictly applies the breach date rule. The defendant
has to pay more of the foreign currency to satisfy the fixed dollar judg-
ment amount. The defendant's liability increases because of the devalua-
tion. Likewise, if the dollar depreciates in terms of the foreign currency,
the defendant has to pay fewer units of foreign currency to equal the
dollar damage amount. Similar inequities occur with the judgment date
rule.108
The two rule doctrine's failure to consider the actual function of
money in the contract further impedes the fair operation of the doctrine.
The breach date rule assumes that the foreign currency is a commodity."°
'o" See text accompanying note 73 supra.
10 CORBIN, supra note 9, at 54, 64-65.
"I The judgment date rule creates inequitable remedies because there is no adjust-
ment for inflation or devaluation. Dollar Damage Awards, supra note 2, at 761-62. The
breaching party can benefit from inflation if a lag occurs in the exchange market's adjust-
ment for inflation. If the judgment date exchange rate does not accurately reflect the rate of
inflation, the breaching party can pay the judgment with a relatively less valuable currency.
Similarly, an inflexible market would allow a judgment day valuation to increase the real
costs of a judgment when there was a currency devaluation. Id.
109 Drake, The Proper Rule in Fluctuating Exchanges, 28 MICH. L. REV. 229, 238 (1930);
Measurement of Foreign Money, supra note 13, at 218, 223. The function of currency is
determined by reference to choice of law theories. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
The currency of the country whose law governs the transaction acts as money. See text ac-
companying note 19 supra. But see Evan, supra note 9, at 327-30. One commentator asserts
that the intent of the parties should determine the function of currency. Id. The terms of the
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The judgment date rule maintains that foreign currency functions as
money.11 ° These assumptions are riot valid in all circumstances. The
American who obtains English pounds for payment of a debt valued in
pounds is not dealing in a commodity. The pound acts as a measure of
value rather than as a commodity. Under the two rule doctrine, United
States courts would use the breach date rule to grant the plaintiff
damages for the change in the value of the foreign commodity. Applica-
tion of the breach date rule, however, would be improper. The intent of
the parties was to trade in money, not commodities, and the injured par-
ty should not receive damages for breach of a contract to deliver com-
modities."'
Finally, the two rule doctrine operates unfairly by allocating the risk
of currency fluctuation without reference to the intent of the parties.
United States law maintains that one who contracts for a specific per-
formance assumes the risk of exchange rate fluctuation and inflation
reducing the real value of the bargained-for consideration."' The parties
may have intended the debtor to accept the cost of inflation. The two
rule doctrine, however, thrusts the cost of a subsequent exchange rate
fluctuation on one of the parties. Use of the breach date or judgment
date rule and the direction of the exchange rate fluctuation determines
the final allocation of risk."1 Choice of law criteria determine which rule
applies."' The two rule doctrine, therefore, ignores the intent of the par-
ties in allocating risk."1
A flexible interpretation of the two rule doctrine is a more equitable
alternative to the current application of the two rule doctrine. Ine-
quitable judgments arise from the two rule doctrine's concern with
contract reflect the intent of the parties. Id. For example, if the place of performance is in
the United States a court would interpret the intent of the parties to use foreign currency
as a commodity. Several decisions have followed a more thorough analysis of the parties' in-
tent. In Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N.Y. 163, 165, 149 N.E. 338, 339-40 (1925), the
court determined the intended use of the currency after performance of the contract. The
Richard court held that although the foreign currency acted as money in the foreign coun-
try, the currency was for use as a commodity in the market. Id. See also Metcalf Co. v.
Mayer, 213 App. Div. 607, 613-14, 211 N.Y.S. 53, 56-58 (1925) (indicating that determination
of date of conversion depends primarily upon intent of parties).
Il See text accompanying note 20 supra.
.' Evan, supra note 4, at 320-22.
"' CORBIN, supra note 53, at 59, 63-67. The intent of the parties in the allocation of risk
differs from the concept of the parties intent to determine the function of money. See note
14 supra. The two rule doctrine places the cost of a subsequent exchange rate fluctuation on
one of the parties. See text accompanying notes 107 & 108 supra. A court allocates the risk
by determining whether the breach of judgment date rule applies and the direction of the
exchange rate fluctuation. The court might frustrate the intent of the parties by placing the
cost of the fluctuation on the wrong party. One of the parties might have assumed the risk.
See text accompanying note 151 infra. The two rule doctrine, however, would disregard this
intent and place the cost on the other party. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 106-108 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
" CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1005, at 60.
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uniformity and judicial economy.116 Instead of achieving uniformity and
judicial economy, courts should apply the doctrine to achieve results
that place the injured party* in as good a position as he would have en-
joyed in the absence of the breach."7 The judgment should reflect the ef-
fects of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, the actual function of
money, and the intent of the parties in the assignment of risk."'
The courts should adjust the final damage amount by the quan-
tifiable effect that inflation and fluctuation of the exchange rates have
had on the currencies.' A court could increase a judgment by the
relative change in the inflation rate of the currencies."' In Humphrey,
the super-inflationary period subsequent to World War I dramatically
reduced the value of plaintiff's recovery."' The plaintiff could have
received a fully compensatory recovery if the Supreme Court had ad-
justed the recovery by the rate of inflation. Instead, the Court adopted
the policy that the law takes no notice of currency fluctuations.2 ' By per-
mitting adjustment for devaluation or inflation, a flexible approach
would prevent the breaching party from benefitting from inflation or a
devaluation."
A flexible approach would also account for the actual function of
money. A contract requiring the payment of a foreign currency in the
United States does not necessarily mean that the foreign currency func-
tions as a commodity. The actual function of money depends on the facts
of the case. Currently, the vested rights theory determines the role of
money."4 To better account for the function of money, a court should also
analyze the facts to determine the intent of the parties in allocating the
risk of currency fluctuation."' The parties may desire the foreign cur-
11. Id. at 64-65.
117 Id.
1 See text accompanying notes 109-115 supra.
19 Dollar Damage Awards,. supra note 2, at 763-64.
120 Id.
11 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
1 272 U.S. at 518-19.
'1 Dollar Damage Awards, supra note 2, at 761-64.
,2 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
SCORBIN, supra note 9, at 59-60; Evan, supra note 4, at 322. Parties to a foreign cur-
rency contract assume the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. CORBIN, supra note 9, at 60. No
reason exists for a court to assume, without reference to the intent of the parties, that a
particular party has accepted the risk of subsequent fluctuations. Id. The two rule doctrine
requires such an assumption. Id. The categorization of the foreign currency as commodity or
money determined which party bears the risk of currency fluctuation. Id. Several countries
currently permit recovery for damages in foreign currencies. See note 1 supra. The courts
of these countries do not assume the function of the currencies but enforce the intent of the
parties. Id. The terms of the contract dictate which currency is the commodity and which the
unit of measure. Id. No case involving a foreign currency rule country has come before a
United States court. Consequently, precedent fails to indicate whether a United States
court would apply the contractual intent of the parties according to the foreign law or apply
the traditional assumptions of the two rule doctrine and the nominalism theory. Never-
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rency to act as a unit of measure in order to put the risk of exchange
rate fluctuation on the United States party.'28 A contract to deliver
pounds to an American in order to pay a debt puts the risk of a decline in
the value of the pounds on the American. The two rule doctrine automa-
tically considers the pound a commodity and puts the risk on the English
party. If the parties intend the currency to be a measure of value,
American courts should not grant damage judgments for breach of con-
tract."' Courts should use the breach date rule only when the currency
functions as a commodity. Consideration of the facts of the case and the
allocation of risk, therefore, indicate the correct function of currency and
enable the courts to fashion an equitable judgment.
The flexible approach would result in a fully compensable judgment,
and would leave the plaintiff in as good a position as if there had been no
breach."8 Application of such an approach, however, would not be
without costs. Currently, courts do not make inflationary adjustments in
purely national disputes." Adjustments for inflation in foreign currency
disputes could carry over into local cases. Adjustment of all judgments
could cause instability in the dollar."' Moreover, consideration of all the
equitable concerns involved in a dispute may create a burden on the
court.'3 ' The ease and efficiency of the choice of law approach would be
lost. Examination of the effects of inflation, rate fluctuation, the intent of
the parties and means of adequate compensation would consume time
and money. While judicial economy, predictability, and possible eco-
nomic consequences are important considerations, a major goal of the
judicial system is fair and equitable relief for an injured party. Courts
should not seek attainment of judicial economy, uniformity and predic-
tability at the expense of fairness and equity. The courts should apply
the two rule doctrine to achieve equitable results within reasonable
limits dictated by practical considerations.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, Ltd. v.
United Shipping Co.,"' illustrates how a court may use the two rule doc-
thele~s, damages for depreciation of the dollar clearly are contrary to public policy and a
United States court will not award such damages regardless of the requirements of foreign
law. Evan, supra note 4, at 351.
I" Evan, supra note 4, at 320, 327-30. A party contracting to receive money accepts the
risk of a fluctuation in the value of the currency. Id. The contract is for a fixed number of
units that may decrease in real value before performance of the contract. The law of
damages does not allow recovery for a reduction in the purchasing power of money subse-
quent to a breach. Id.
12 See note 111 supra.
' CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1005, at 63.
' Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 355-58 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294, U.S.
317, 329 (1935); United States v. Two Hundred Fifty-four United States Twenty Dollar Gold
Coins, 355 F. Supp. 298, 301-02 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
' CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1005, at 60.
" Fluctuating Rates, supra note 3, at 625.
"' 643 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1981).
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trine in an efficient yet equitable fashion. On November 12, 1977 Jamaica
Nutrition Holdings purchased a quantity of soybean oil which United
Shipping agreed to transport from Louisiana to Jamaica. '3 The oil arrived
in Jamaica contaminated by traces of molasses."4 Jamaica Nutrition paid
45,206 Jamaican dollars to refine the oil to remove the molasses.135
Jamaica Nutrition claimed that United Shipping breached its con-
tractual duty to exercise due diligence to make the vessel fit for the car-
riage of soybean oil.'38 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the charter
agreement between Jamaica Nutrition and United Shipping incor-
porated the responsibilities dictated by the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA).'37 Section 1303(1) of COGSA places a duty on the carrier to
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.'38 The court found
that United Shipping's failure to clean the vessel properly after the
previous voyage constituted a violation of section 1303(1) of COGSA."3'
The Fifth Circuit confirmed the district court's conclusion that the cost
of reprocessing was the proper measure of damages. "" The appellate
court had to determine when to convert the Jamaican dollars into United
States dollars.4
I33 Id. at 378. In Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, the plaintiff purchased soybean oil from





.37 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976). The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) is a com-
prehensive statute specifying the duties, rights, responsibilities, liabilities and immunities
of a carrier and ship. Id. The carrier must exercise due diligence before the voyage to
assure that the vessel is seaworthy, properly supplied and equipped, and the cargo holds
safe. Id. § 1313. The carrier is also responsible for the proper storage and shipment of the
cargo. Id. The carrier is liable for loss or damage only if the damage resulted from fault or
neglect of the carrier. Id.
13" 643 F.2d at 379. Section 1303(1) of the COGSA places a duty on the carrier to exer-
cise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976). Section 1304 ex-
plains the rights and immunities of a carrier and ship and limits the liabilities of the carrier
to those arising from want of due diligence. Id. § 1304(1). See Director General of India Sup.
Mission v. Steamship Janet Quinn, 335 F. Supp. 1329, 1334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Demsey &
Associates, Inc. v. Steamship Sea Star, 321 F. Supp. 663, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified
461 F.2d 1009 (1972).
643 F.2d at 381.
14 Id. at 379.
" Id. COGSA does not require a specific conversion date for breaches of contract. 46
U.S.C. § 1300-1315 (1976). On March 31, 1978, a United Nations Conference on the Carriage
of Goods by Sea adopted the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Good by Sea. 9
M. NORDQUIST & K. SIMMONS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, 344, 361 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as NORDQUIST & SIMMONS]. Twenty-nine nations, including the United
States, have either signed, ratified or adhered to the Convention. MULTILATERAL TREATIES
IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS 421 (1979).
The Convention is similar to COGSA and establishes rules relating to the carriage of goods
by sea. NORDQUIST & SIMMONS, supra at 362. It differs from COGSA, however, by requiring
conversion rate set on the judgment date. Id., Art. 26 § 1. The Convention states that the
courts of a country adhering to the Convention must convert foreign currency into the cur-
[Vol. XXXIX
CONVERSION OF JUDGMENTS
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that COGSA imposed a duty of care on
United Shipping under United States law.1 12 United Shipping breached
their duty to make the vessel seaworthy when the vessel "broke
ground" in Louisiana."' The breach in the United States created a cause
of action governed by United States law. 4 Since American law governed
the case, the court applied the Hicks rule of valuation on the breach
date.
1 4 5
In Jamaica Nutrition, the Fifth Circuit utilized the limited flexibility
that has developed in the breach date rule to compensate the plaintiff
for his losses. The court interpreted precedent as indicating that the
date of loss and the date of repair cost payment qualified as breach
dates under the two rule doctrine."' The Fifth Circuit used the date of
payment of the refining costs as the conversion date.4 7 Use of this
breach date prevented United Shipping from bearing the full cost of in-
flation.
While the Jamaica Nutrition court did use a flexible breach date
rule, the decision did not reflect use of a flexible interpretation of the
rency of the forum state at the date of judgment or a date agreed upon by the parties. Id.
The convention is not yet in force. MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE o
SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS 421 (1979); see NORDQUIST & SIM.
MONS, supra at 364.
242 643 F.2d at 380.
m Id. at 381.
144 Id.
"I Id. The Fifth Circuit supported application of a breach date valuation in Jamaica
Nutrition by reference to tort cases involving foreign currencies decided by the Second Cir-
cuit. Id. at 380. The Second Circuit distinguishes between torts occurring in foreign coun-
tries and those taking place in the forum state. Id. The laws of the foreign country govern
foreign torts. Id. United States courts will convert the damages of a tort governed by
foreign law at the judgment day exchange rate. Conte v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277
F.2d 664, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1960). United States law controls causes of action arising from torts
committed in the United States. RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 144. Conversion in these
cases will be at the breach date conversion rate. Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The
Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1951). The Fifth Circuit found in Jamaica Nutri-
tion that the conversion date principle for tort cases also applied to breach of contract
disputes. 643 F.2d at 381. The Fifth Circuit also discerned a lack of uniformity in the Second
Circuit's determination of the date of breach. Id. The Second Circuit has used the date the
cause of action arose, Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d at 955, the
date the loss is suffered, Indemnity Mutual Assurance Co. v. United States, 1935 A.M.C.
809 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), and the date of payment for the cost of repairs, The Gylfe v. The Tru-
jillo, 209 F.2d 386, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1954) to apply the Hicks breach date rule.
144 643 F.2d at 381. Case law reflects a limited amount of flexibility in the two rule doc-
trine. In Jamaica Nutrition the Fifth Circuit analyzed several Second Circuit decisions that
broadly apply the breach date rule. Id. The Gylfe v. The Trujillo, 209 F.2d 386, 387-88 (2d
Cir. 1954); Indemnity Mut. Assurance Co. v. United States, 1935 A.M.C. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1934);
The Verdi, 268 F. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). The Second Circuit has interpreted the term "breach
date" to include the date the loss is suffered and the date the cost of the repairs is paid. See
note 145 supra. The flexibility created by the broad interpretation of "breach date" allows a
court to grant a more equitable judgment. CORBIN, supra note 9, at 63-65. The court could
adjust the breach date to account for the factual circumstances that would make a
mechanical application of the two rule doctrine inequitable. Id.
... 643 F.2d at 380-81.
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two rule doctrine. The Fifth Circuit applied United States law because
the breach of duty imposed by COGSA occurred in Louisiana. 8 The
court failed to consider where the parties contracted, the place of per-
formance, the currency of contract or which country had the most signifi-
cant relationship with the breach.' The court used the rigid vested
rights theory rather than a more flexible theory that considers a variety
of factors in the choice of law determination. 5 ' Furthermore, the court
did not consider the intent of the parties. The opinion makes no mention
of the parties' contractual provisions concerning risk,15' nor does the
judgment include adjustments for inflation. The court merely indicates
that the possible costs or profits from a devaluation should not fall on
the injured party.5 ' Concern for the effect of devaluation, however, did
not appear in the court's reasoning for application of the breach date
rule. Finally, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the role of Jamaican cur-
rency as a measure of value rather than as a commodity.153 A flexible two
rule doctrine would have evaluated these factors in the process of deter-
mining the appropriate exchange rate.
The current application of the two rule doctrine sacrifices considera-
tion of equitable concerns for uniformity, judicial economy and ease of
application."4 The vested rights theory ignores modern choice of law
principles. 5  Although the criteria used by the vested rights theory to
determine the governing law are easy to apply, the criteria do not
always yield a correct determination of the controlling law. The fair
operation of the two rule doctrine requires a proper choice of law
analysis. The rigidity of the two rule doctrine creates uniformity and
judicial economy. These advantages arise from courts' reluctance to
analyze the effects of inflation, devaluations, the intent of the parties,
and the actual function of money.'56 Courts must balance the advantages
of uniformity and economy against the advantages of a fully compensa-
tory judgment. A flexible two rule doctrine would provide a framework
for the achievement of equitable judgments within limitations imposed
by practical considerations.'57
THOMAS J. EGAN, JR.
148 Id.
"' Id.; see text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
150 See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
151 643 F.2d at 381.
152 Id.
Id.
,S See text accompanying note 131 supra.
155 See text accompanying notes 59-73 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 132-147 supra.
643 F.2d at 381. The Fifth Circuit in Jamaica Nutrition employed the currently
available inflexible two rule doctrine. See text accompanying note 149 supra. The court's
use of the flexible breach date rule resulted in a partially compensatory judgment. See text
accompanying notes 146-147 supra. The court correctly applied the precedents, but did not
advance explicitly towards a truly equitable two rule doctrine. See text accompanying
notes 146-153 supra.
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